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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we study path auction games in which multiple edges may be owned by the
same agent. The edge costs and the set of edges owned by the same agent are privately
known to the owner of the edges. In this setting, we show that, assuming that edges not
on the winning path always get 0 payment, there is no individually rational, strategyproof
mechanism in which only edge costs are reported. If the agents are asked to report costs
as well as identity information, we show that there is no Pareto efficient mechanism that
is false-name proof. We then study a first-price path auction in this model. We show that,
in the special case of parallel-path graphs, there is always a Pareto efficient pure strategy
-Nash equilibrium in bids. However, this result does not extend to general graph; we
construct a graph in which there is no Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and motivation
In the path auction game, there is a network G = (V , E), in which each edge e ∈ E is owned by an agent. The true cost of e
is private information and known only to the owner. Given two vertices, source s and destination t , the auctioneer’s task is
to buy a path from s to t . The path auction game can be used tomodel problems in supply chainmanagement, transportation
management, QoS routing and other domains. Recently, path auctions have been extensively studied [3,8,5–7]; most of the
literature has focused on the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) class ofmechanisms [4,2,1]. In themost natural VCGmechanism,
the auctioneer pays each agent on the winning path an amount equal to the highest bid with which the agent would still
be on the winning path. This mechanism is attractive because it is efficient and strategyproof, i.e., the dominant strategy for
each agent is to report his true cost.
1.1. Motivation for a new model
In the traditional path auction model, each agent only owns one edge in the graph, and there is no cooperation between
agents. Here, we study a variant of the path auction game in which each agent may own multiple edges. In this extended
model, if ownership information is publicly available (i.e. the auctioneer knows which agent owns which edge), the VCG
mechanism design approach still yields a strategyproof mechanism.
In practice, however, ownership information is often private — it could be costly for the auctioneer to find out the true
ownership information, or an agentmay have incentive to hide the true ownership information in order to get better payoff.
For example, in Fig. 1, there are two agents: a and b. Agent a owns edges (s, i) and (i, t)with true cost 1 each; agent b owns
edges (s, j) and (j, t) with true cost 2 each. If the true ownership information is known to the auctioneer, the most natural
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Fig. 1. VCG mechanism is not strategyproof for this game.
VCGmechanismwould reduce to a second price auction: it will choose path (s, i), (i, t) as the winning path and pay agent a
an amount equal to 4. However, if agent a hides his ownership information, themechanismwill treat edges (s, i) and (i, t) as
owned by different agents. When the agents bid their true costs, the winning path stays the same, but the payment to agent
a would be 2 × 3 = 6. Moreover, when ownership information is not available to the auctioneer, agent a can increase his
utility by bidding lower than his true cost. For example, he can bid 0.5 for both edges (s, i) and (i, t). This does not change
the winning path, but the payment to agent a would increase to 2× 3.5 = 7. Hence, the straightforward VCG mechanism,
which assumes that each edge is owned by a distinct agent, is not strategyproof in this extended model.
In this paper, we model situations in which each agent can own multiple edges at the same time, but ownership
information is private. Thus the traditional path auction model is a special case of our extended model. The possibility
of one agent having multiple identities is inherent in online communities. In an online auction system, each seller/buyer
may have multiple accounts in the system. Now, if a buyer wants some combination of goods that can be expressed in
path auction form, it will be hard for him to find the true identity of each seller account, and so he will be faced with the
unknown-ownership scenario.
1.2. Related work and our results
Path auction games have been extensively studied in recent years. Nisan and Ronen introduced the shortest-path game in
their paper on algorithmic mechanism design [3], and showed that the VCGmechanism for this problem is computationally
tractable. However, several authors have noted that the VCG mechanism may pay much more than the true cost of the
winning path. This has led to the study of the frugality [5] of the VCGmechanism. Archer and Tardos [5], and Elkind et al. [7]
studied frugality in path auctions, and showed that payments can be arbitrarily high. Karlin et al. [8] extended the path
model to a more general set systemmodel and introduced a new frugality ratio definition; they designed a mechanism that
performs better than the VCG in path auctions. The problem of an agent owning multiple edges was mentioned as future
work in [8]. Immorlica et al. [6] studied first-price path auctions in the traditional single-ownership setting. They showed
the existence of a strong -Nash equilibrium in bids, and bounded the payments in equilibrium. Schummer [15] studied the
bribe-proof auction, in which no agent can pay another one to lie so that both of them are better off. Schummer showed that
if the domain is rich, the only bribe-proof mechanism is a constant function. However, path auction games do not satisfy the
monotonically closed condition (‘‘richness’’ condition) in [15]. Yokoo et al. [9] introduced the concept of false-name proof
mechanisms, in which the (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent is to report his true values as well as true identities,
and showed that, in combinatorial auctions, there is no false-name proof mechanism that satisfies Pareto efficiency. The
problem of unknown ownership [10] has also been studied in the context of job scheduling by Moulin.
The results we report here were presented in preliminary form at the NetEcon06 Workshop [14]. Following our work,
Iwasaki et al. [16] recently designed two mechanisms – MP and AP – for path auction games. The MP mechanism is false-
name-proof (cannot self-split) when each agent owns only one edge. Moreover, a nice property of theMP mechanism is that
its frugality ratio nearlymatches a lower bound of any false-name-proofmechanism. The AP mechanism is false-name-proof
when an agent can own multiple edges. However, one drawback of the AP mechanism is that it does not always purchase a
feasible solution.
In this paper, we show that if the agents only submit bid prices in the auction for each edge (implicitly the auctioneer
treats each edge as owned by a different agent), there is no strategyproof mechanism that satisfies individually rationality
under the assumption that the losing agent always has 0 utility. Our result does not need the assumption about the ‘‘richness’’
of domain as required in [15]. Moreover, we consider mechanisms in which agents are invited to reveal all their private
information: the identities of edges as well as the costs. We show that previous results on false-name proof mechanisms [9]
imply that there is no Pareto-efficient false-name proof mechanism in the extended path auction model. We next turn
to a first-price auction bidding game, and study -Nash equilibria of this game. For the class of parallel-path graphs, we
constructively prove that at least one Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium exists. However, we find a non-
parallel-path graph that does not have a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium.
2. Definitions and problem statement
We now introduce formal definitions of the path auction game based on set systems defined in [8]. We begin by defining
simple path auctions, in which ownership of each edge is known to be distinct. We then define an extended path auction
model that incorporates multiple edge ownership.
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2.1. Simple path auctions
Given a graph G = (V , E), let each edge e ∈ E be owned by a distinct agent and have a cost ce, the true cost incurred
on the owner if the edge is selected. This value is private, i.e. known only to agent that owns e. We define the feasible set
F = {P|P is a path from the source s to the destination t}. Note that a path is represented by the set of its edges. The task of
the auctioneer is to buy a path from s to t by auction. It consists of the following two steps:
(i) Each agent submits a sealed bid be to the auctioneer. The bidding vector b is (be1 , be2 , . . . , bem), where bei is the bidding
price for the edge ei ∈ E. Moreover, let B denote the bidding space, which is the set of all possible bidding vectors.
(ii) Given the bidding vector b, the auctioneer selects a path P from the feasible set F as the winning path, and computes a
payment pe for each edge e ∈ P . An agent wins if he owns an edge e on the winning path P j; otherwise he loses.
In order to implement the auction, we need to design a mechanism (f , p1, p2, . . . , pm), where f : B → F selects one
element in the feasible set as the winning path and pi : B → R computes the payment to agent i. Moreover, we assume
that:
(i) (G, F) is common knowledge to the auctioneer and all the agents.
(ii) The game ismonopoly free, which means no edge is in all the feasible sets, i.e.
⋂
P j∈F P j = ∅.
(iii) The agents are rational and have quasilinear utilities. The utility is defined to be the payment minus the incurred true
cost, i.e., ue = pe − ce if e is on the winning path; or else ue = pe. The agents want to maximize their utilities.
2.2. Extended path auctions
We extend the simple path auctions model to allow for the possibility that each agent owns multiple edges. The edge
set E can be partitioned as E = ⋃i Ei, where Ei is the set of edges owned by agent i. We also assume that an agent i that
owns ki edges, i.e. |Ei| = ki, can have up to ki identities IDi = {IDi1, IDi2 . . . , IDiki} to use in an auction, one for each edge. We
assume that Ei and IDi are private information, which is only known to agent i. Moreover, for two different agents i and j,
IDi
⋂
IDj = ∅, i.e., an agent cannot claim an identity that belongs to another agent for one of his own edges. In the extended
model, a game is monopoly free if, for any agent i, there is at least one path between s and t in graph (V , E \Ei). Furthermore,
given the winning path P , the utility for agent i is ui = ∑ei∈Ei pei −∑ei∈P cei . According to different formats of bidding
languages, we can define two formats of extended path auctions.
– Format I: in this type of auction, each agent is only asked to submit the bidding price for each edge he ownswhile keeping
the identity information private.
– Format II: in this type of auction, the agent is asked to submit identity information (possibly false) about the set of edges
he owns as well as the bidding price for each edge he claims to own.
We will next extend some basic game theory definitions [9,13] to the extended path auction model. Since an agent can
own multiple edges in the extended model, the agent needs to submit a bidding price for each edge that belongs to him.
Thus, let bi be the bidding vector of agent iwhile ci be the true cost vector of agent i. Furthermore, let b−i denote the bidding
vector of all agents except agent i.
Definition 1. A strategy profile b is an -Nash equilibrium if for any agent i and any bidding vector b′i of agent i, given the
bidding vector b−i of other agents, ui(bi, b−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b−i)− .
Definition 2. A bidding strategy bi of agent i is a dominant strategy, if for any bidding vector b−i of other agents and any
bidding vector b
′
i of agent i, ui(bi, b−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b−i).
In auctions of format I, we introduce the concept of strategyproofness.
Definition 3. A format I auction mechanism is strategyproof if it is a dominant strategy for each agent i to bid his true value,
i.e., bi = ci.
The VCGmechanism is strategyproof in the simple path auction, i.e. the dominant strategy of each agent is to bid his true
cost in VCG mechanism. Besides strategyproofness, individual rationality, which requires that no agent should be paid less
than the cost he incurs, is another important concept studied in mechanism design.
Definition 4. A mechanism is individually rational iff for any agent i, when he bids truthfully, the payment to agent i is at
least the true cost he incurs in the solution chosen by the mechanism, i.e. every agent should have nonnegative utility in the
mechanism if he bids truthfully.
In auctions of format II, we introduce the solution concept of false-name-proofness.
Definition 5. A format II auction mechanism is false-name-proof if, for any agent, it is a dominant strategy to report the
true identity information of each edge as well as the true cost of each edge he owns.
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In both formats of extended path auctions, amechanismwill choose awinning path from feasible paths andmake payments
to the agents. The definition of Pareto efficiency is:
Definition 6. A winning path selection rule is Pareto efficient if the mechanism chooses P i as the winning path such that
∀k,∑e∈P i ce ≤∑e∈Pk ce.
In the economic literature, Pareto efficiency is defined to be an allocation such that no agent can be better offwithoutmaking
another agent worse off. The definition of Pareto efficiency in this paper follows from the definition in [9], which is different
from the standard definition in general. However, in the quasilinear utility setting, we assume those two definitions are
equivalent.
3. The nonexistence of individually rational strategyproof mechanisms
In the extended path auction model, one natural question is whether it is possible to design an auction mechanism that
asks agents to report only edge costs (format I), such that it is in every agent’s best interest to bid the true cost for each edge
he owns. In this section, we show that no reasonablemechanism canmeet this requirement. Note that the strategyproofness
condition defined in this paper is essentially equivalent to the bribe-proof condition in [15]. However, since path auction
games do not satisfy themonotonically closed condition, the results in [15] cannot be applied here.
Webeginwith a characterization of strategyproof auctionmechanisms that iswell known from the literature on auctions.
We state the theorem in the following, as we will rely on it in our proofs.
Theorem 1 ([8,12,13]). The set of individually rational strategyproof auction mechanisms, in which all the losing agents are
paid 0, can be characterized as follows:
(i) A mechanism is strategyproof only if the selection rule is monotone: No losing agent can become a winner by raising his bid,
given fixed bids by all other agents.
(ii) Given a monotone selection rule, there is a unique strategyproof mechanism with this selection rule. This mechanism pays
each agent his threshold bid, i.e. the supremum of all values he could have bid and won.
Actually, we can construct a trivial strategyproof mechanism, which always selects a fixed path as the winning path and
pays a fixed amount of money to the edges on the path. We call such a mechanism the dictator mechanism. It is not hard to
verify that the dictator mechanism is strategyproof. However, it does not satisfy individual rationality.
Our impossibility proof builds on the characterization of strategyproofmechanisms.We beginwith the following lemma,
which shows that for any individually rational strategyproof mechanism, any bid vector can be perturbed slightly to ensure
that all winners have strictly positive net utilities.
Lemma 1. Consider individually rational strategyproof mechanisms for the extended path auction model in which edges not on
the winning path are always paid 0. For any such mechanism (f , pe1 , . . . , pem), any  > 0, and any strictly positive cost vector
b1 = (b1e1 , . . . , b1em), there exists another cost vector b
′ = (b′e1 , . . . , b
′
em) such that: (1)When the agents have true costs given
by b
′
and bid truthfully, every edge on the winning path has strictly positive utility; (2) for all j, |b1ej − b
′
ej | ≤ .
Proof. Suppose that b1 is a given cost vector, and that when the agents bid according to b1, the winning path is P1, i.e.
f (b1) = P1. By assumption, the edges not on the winning path have utility 0 since they are paid 0 and have 0 incurred
cost. If every edge on the winning path is paid strictly more than his bid, we are done. Otherwise, some of the edges on
the winning path have utility exactly 0; in this case, we will modify the cost (and bid) vector according to the following
procedure.
In the first modification step, for an edge e1 ∈ P1, we decrease the costs of e1 from b1e1 to b1e1 − , and keep the cost of all
other edges unchanged. Let T = {e1}. Thuswe get a new true cost vector b2; let P2 = f (b2). According to Theorem 1, e1must
be on the newwinning path P2. Moreover, we claim that the payment to the edge e1 should not change, i.e. pe1(b
1) = pe1(b2).
Otherwise, if pe1(b
1) > pe1(b
2), an edge with true cost b1e1 −  could improve its utility by increasing its bidding price to b1e1 .
If pe1(b
1) < pe1(b
2), an edge with true cost b1e1 could improve its utility by decreasing its bidding price to b
1
e1 − . Both cases
contradict the strategyproofness of the mechanism. Since pe1(b
1) = pe1(b2), when the true cost of the edge e1 decreases
from b1e1 to b
1
e1 − , its utility will increase by ; thus, e1 will have strictly positive utility under cost vector b2.
In the kth step, where k ≥ 2, we choose an edge ek ∈ Pk \ T . We decrease the cost of ek from bkek to bkek − 2k−1 and
keep the bidding prices of all other edges unchanged. Thus we get a new bidding vector bk+1 and f (bk+1) = Pk+1. Let
T = T ⋃{ek}. Similar to the argument above, the edge ek must be on the new winning path Pk+1, and its utility must have
increased by 
2k−1 because the payment to it does not change. Moreover, we claim that any edge ej ∈ T is still on the new
winning path Pk+1 and its utility cannot decrease by more than 
2k−1 , i.e. pej(b
k+1) − pej(bk) ≥ − 2k−1 . Otherwise, suppose
pej(b
k+1)− pej(bk) < − 2k−1 . It can happen that both edges ej and ek are owned by the same agent i, and the true cost of the
edge ek is bkek− 2k−1 . Thus, agent i can increase its utility by increasing the bidding price of the edge ek to bkek . This contradicts
strategyproofness. Furthermore, since the utility of the edge ej ∈ T cannot decrease by more than 2k−1 at the kth step and
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
2j−1 >
∑N
i=j+1

2i−1 for any finite number N > j, the edge ej always has positive utility. Therefore, given the assumption that
the edges not on the winning path are always paid 0, the edge ej is always on the new winning path Pk for k ≥ j. Thus, all
the edges in T are on the winning path and have positive utilities.
Since the number of edges is finite, the above proceduremust stop.When the process is terminated, suppose thewinning
path P = T and the final cost vector is b′ . According to the argument above, every winning agent must have positive utility
when the agents have true costs b
′
and bid truthfully. 
We now prove the main result. The intuition behind this result is that, for strategyproofness to hold in the extended
model, the payments made to the set of winning edges must increase if all costs increase; this, however, implies that agents
can profit by inflating their bids.
Theorem 2. There is no individually rational strategyproof format I mechanism in which all the edges not on the winning path
are always paid 0.
Proof. Suppose there is a strategyproof mechanism. By Lemma 1, consider a bidding vector b such that losing agents have
utilities 0 while winning agents have positive utilities. For an edge ej that is not on the winning path P , increasing bej to b
′
ej
cannot change the winning path. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose the winning path changes from P to P
′
, then there exists an edge e ∈ P but e /∈ P ′ . According to Theorem 1,
ej cannot be on P
′
. Thus its utility is still 0. Now, suppose an agent i owns both ej and e. If the true cost of ej is b
′
ej , agent
i can increase its utility by understating ej’s true cost as bej , since e has positive utility when it is on winning path P . This
contradicts strategyproofness. Moreover, increasing bej does not change the payment to any edge. For any edge e /∈ P , the
payment to it is always 0. Suppose increasing bej to b
′
ej could increase the payment to the edge e ∈ P from pe to p
′
e, i.e. pe < p
′
e.
It can happen that an agent i owns both ej and e, and the true cost of the edge ej is bej . Thus, agent i can increase its utility
by overstating ej’s cost as b
′
ej . This contradicts strategyproofness too. Similarly, we can show that increasing bej to b
′
ej cannot
decrease the payment to an edge e ∈ P . Therefore, for an edge ej that is not on the winning path, increasing its bid cannot
change either the winning path or the payment to any agent.
Similarly, we can prove that for an edge ej that is on the winning path, decreasing bej cannot change either the winning
path or the payment to any edge.
Now we can construct a suitable pair of bid vectors that result in the same path being selected. According to Lemma 1,
for any individually rational strategyproof mechanism (f , pe1 , . . . , pem) and any strictly positive bidding vector b, we can
construct a sequence of bidding vectors b(r) = (r × be1 − (e1, r), . . . , r × bem − (em, r)) such that the winning agents
always have positive utilities, where r ∈ N and ∀j, (ej, r) is a small positive number. Let B = {b(r)|r ∈ N} denote the
set of all such bidding vectors. For each b(r) ∈ B, f (b(r)) will select a winning path. Since the size of B is infinite, but
there are only a finite number of possible winning paths, there must be an infinite subsequence B
′ = {b(r1), b(r2) . . . . . .}
such that ∀b(ri) ∈ B ′ , f (b(ri)) = P . According to the assumption of individual rationality, and given that the payment
to each edge is finite, we can find two bidding vectors b(p), b(q) ∈ B ′ such that for any edge ej on the winning path P ,
bej(p) ≤ pej(b(p)) < bej(q) ≤ pej(b(q)).
Given bidding vectors b(p) and b(q), we can construct a new bidding vector b∗ such that b∗ej = min{bej(p), bej(q)} if ej
is on the winning path P while b∗ej = max{bej(p), bej(q)} if ej is not on the wining path. According to the construction and
the above arguments, we can get ∀ej, pej(b(p)) = pej(b∗) = pej(b(q)). This contradicts the fact that for any edge ej on the
winning path P , pej(b(p)) < bej(q) ≤ pej(b(q)).
Therefore, given the condition that the edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, there is no strategyproof
mechanism that satisfies individual rationality. 
Remark. In the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, the contradictions occur even if each agent owns only two edges.
Therefore, in the extended path auction game, there is no individually rational strategyproof mechanism in which the edges
not on thewinning path are paid 0, even if each agent can only have two edges.We believe that if we remove the assumption
that the edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, Theorem 2 still holds. It would be interesting to find a simple
proof for such an extension of Theorem 2.
Given Theorem 2, the next natural question to ask is: if the auctioneer asks the agents to submit ownership information
as well as the bidding price information (format II), is it possible to get a false-name-proof [9] mechanism? In [9], Yokoo
et al. showed that:
Proposition 1 ([9]). In combinatorial auctions, there is no false-name-proof auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency.
Proposition 1 is shown by constructing a generic combinatorial auction example, which does not have a false-name-
proof auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency. That example has two items to sell and three bidders, where bidder 1
is interested in packages {1}, {2} and the whole package {1, 2}, bidder 2 is only interested in the whole package {1, 2} while
bidder 3 is only interested in {2}. In particular, bidder 1 has two identities to use. Furthermore, the bidders are given an
option to quit this game by bidding 0.
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Fig. 2. No false-name-proof mechanism that satisfies Pareto efficiency.
We now observe that this counterexample can be viewed as an instance of a path auction (which is a special class of
combinatorial auctions). Each single item in the combinatorial auction corresponds to an edge in the path auction, while the
whole package {1, 2} corresponds to a path between s and t . The path auction game is shown in Fig. 2. The true identity of
the agent that each edge belongs to is represented as an integer in the parentheses. Upon the transformation, the proof of
Proposition 1 still works for the path auction setting. Thus, the following result is immediate.
Corollary 1. In the extended path auction model, there is no false-name proof mechanism that satisfies Pareto efficiency.
Proof. In order to prove this corollary, we first transform the generic combinatorial auction example of Yokoo et al. [9] to
a path auction case as described above. Note that, in the combinatorial auction example, the feasible set with the highest
bidding price will be the winner. However, path auctions, as one type of procurement auctions, will choose the feasible
set with the lowest bidding price as the winning path. To accommodate this difference, we change the directions of all the
inequalities in the proof of Proposition 1 in [9]. Moreover, if a bidding price is perturbed by+ in [9], it is perturbed by−
in the path auction case instead. Thus, the modified proof of Proposition 1 in [9] works exactly for the path auction case and
the corollary is proved. 
4. Existence of a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium
Since strategyproofness is not feasible in the extended path auction model, we can consider weakening the solution
concept. The concept of -Nash equilibrium, which has been applied to path auctions in [6], is a natural candidate. In
this section, we study the existence of -Nash equilibria in extended path auction model under the first-price auction
mechanism [6], which elicits the bids from the agents, chooses the cheapest path with respect to the bidding vector as
the winning path and pays each winning agent exactly the bidding price. Immorlica et al. [6] showed that there is always an
-Nash equilibrium in the simple path auction model. One drawback of the concept of Nash equilibria is that an arbitrary -
Nash equilibriummay have low social welfare. Thus, we require that the Nash equilibria wewill study below satisfies Pareto
efficiency. Another drawback of the concept of -Nash equilibrium is that there exist equilibria in which losing agents bid
below their true costs. To eliminate such unnatural equilibria, we assume that the bidding price of each edge is at least its
true cost, i.e. ∀e, be ≥ ce. With those natural constraints, wewill show that, because of themultiple edge ownership, a Pareto
efficient -Nash equilibrium only exists for a limited class of graphs in extended path auctions.
First, we show the existence of a Pareto efficient -Nash equilibrium in the parallel-path graph [11], which can be
defined as:
Definition 7. A parallel-path graph is a graph that can be represented as
⋃
k P
k, where Pk is the kth path from s to t and
∀i 6= j, P i⋂ P j = ∅.
Let C(Pk) = ∑e∈Pk ce denote the cost of path Pk with respect to true cost vector c. Consider a sorted list of paths from
low to high according to these true costs, i.e. the path with lower cost has smaller index. For any agent Ai, let L(Ai) be the
smallest path index such that path PL(Ai) does not have an edge owned by agent Ai, but all paths with smaller path indices
than L(Ai) have at least one edge owned by agent Ai. We compute L(Ai) for each agent that has at least one edge on P1. Note
that L(Ai)must exist, under the monopoly-free assumption on the set system.We constructively find a Pareto efficient pure
strategy -Nash equilibrium for parallel paths graph in the following theorem. The proof is motivated by [6].
Theorem 3. If the underlying network is a parallel-path graph, the first-price path auction has a Pareto efficient pure strategy
-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The -Nash equilibrium bidding vector is constructed as follows. Initially, suppose that each agent bid her true cost
i.e. b = c . LetWb(Pk) =∑e∈Pk be denote the cost of path Pk with respect to the bidding vector b. Pick an agent Ak that has at
least one edge on P1, and which has the highest value of L(Ak) of all agents that have edges on P1. In order to find an -Nash
equilibrium bidding vector, we first pick one edge in EAk
⋂
P1, and increase its bidding price byWb(PL(Ak))−Wb(P1)−  if
Wb(PL(Ak))−Wb(P1) > ; otherwise, the bidding price of the edge keeps unchanged. For any path j ∈ [2, . . . , L(Ak)−1], we
pick one edge in EAk
⋂
P j and increase its bidding price untilWb′ (P
j) = Wb(PL(Ak)), where b′ is the new bidding vector. We
call the final bidding vector bf . Note that the bidding price for each edge in bf , except those belong to agent Ak, is exactly its
true cost. Since the first price auction mechanism always selects the path with minimum cost, P1 is the winning path under
bf and Ak has at least one edge on it.
We claim that bf is an -Nash equilibrium bidding vector. This is proved by analyzing the strategies of all the agents in
three cases:
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Fig. 3. Auction with no Pareto efficient pure-strategy -Nash equilibrium.
Case I: If an agent Ai is a losing agent, he will bid the true costs for all the edges in EAi . Consider the following two subcases:
(i) For any path j, if the sum of bidding prices for edges in EAi
⋂
P j increases, it cannot change the winning path, therefore
the utility of agent Ai cannot be improved; (ii) If the sum of bidding prices for edges in EAi
⋂
P j decreases such that P j
becomes the winning path, the utility of Ai would be negative. Thus, agent Ai cannot improve his utility through a unilateral
deviation.
Case II: For an agent Ai 6= Ak that owns edges on thewinning path, according to the definition of bf , the edges in EAi would bid
their true costs, too. Similar to the above analysis, agent Ai cannot improve his utility by decreasing the bidding prices. On
the other hand, for any index j ∈ [1, . . . , L(Ak)], suppose agent Ai increases the sum of bidding prices for edges in EAi
⋂
P j.
Again, let b
′
be the new bidding vector. Note that there always exists an index r ∈ [1, . . . , L(Ak)] such that EAi
⋂
P r = ∅
andWb′ (P
r) = Wbf (PL(Ak)) keeps unchanged. Thus, for any path P j, the sum of bidding prices for edges in EAi
⋂
P j cannot
increase bymore than ; otherwise, P r will be thewinning path and agent Ai has utility 0. Therefore, agent Ai cannot increase
his own utility by more than  through a unilateral deviation.
Case III: For agent Ak, his utility is at leastWbf (P
L(Ak))−Wc(P1)−. Similar to the analysis in case II, agent Ak cannot improve
his utility more than  by increasing the bidding prices of edges he owns. Otherwise, PL(Ak) would be the winning path
and the utility of agent Ak would be 0. On the other hand, for any path P j with an index j < L(Ak), if the sum of bidding
prices for edges in EAk
⋂
P j decreases such that the path P j is the winning path, the utility of agent Ak must be less than
Wbf (P
L(Ak))−Wc(P1). Thus, agent Ak cannot improve his utility by more than  through a unilateral deviation.
It is clear that bf is Pareto efficient, since the winning path P1 has the minimum true cost. Therefore, any parallel-path
graph can have a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium when the agents bid according to bf . 
Although there exists a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium for path auctions with parallel-path graphs, we
can find a non-parallel-path graph that does not have any Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium. We show this
counter example in Fig. 3; for each edge label, the integer in parentheses denotes the identity of the agent who owns that
edge.
Proposition 2. The graph shown in Fig. 3 cannot have any Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium in the first-price
path auction mechanism.
Proof. There are 5 agents in this game and 5 paths from s to t:
Path 1: (s, p1, p2, p3, t).
Path 2: (s, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9, p10, t).
Path 3: (s, p4, p5, p6, p12, t).
Path 4: (s, p11, p8, p9, p10, t).
Path 5: (s, p11, p8, p7, p6, p12, t).
Let b be a Pareto efficient -Nash equilibrium bidding vector. We assume that the edges on P1 have small true costs
while all other edges have significantly large true costs. By Pareto efficiency, P1 will be the winning path. Furthermore,
we claim that the cost of each path with respect to b can differ at most by . We prove this by contradiction. Suppose
∃j ∈ [2 . . . 5],Wb(P j) > Wb(P1) + . For any agent i ∈ [1 . . . 4] in Fig. 3, there is only one path that does not have edges
owned by him. We can assume that the path P j does not have edges owned by agent i, but for 4 other paths, agent i owns
edges on each of them. Note that agent i owns only one edge on the winning path P1. Thus, agent i can increase the bidding
prices of his edges (but still keep P1 as the winning path) such that his utility is increased by at least , which leads to a
contradiction. Therefore, if b is a Pareto efficient -Nash equilibrium bidding vector, the cost of each path with respect to b
can differ at most by . Let
A = bp6,p7 + bp7,p8
B = bp8,p9 + bp9,p10 + bp10,t
C = bp6,p12 + bp12,t .
Based on above reasoning, we can get the following two inequalities:
|A+ C − B| ≤  and |A+ B− C | ≤ .
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Therefore, the following inequality holds:
2A ≤ 2.
Moreover, according to our assumption that the bidding price of each edge is at least its true cost, i.e., ∀e, ce ≤ be, the
following inequality holds:
cp6,p7 + cp7,p8 ≤ .
When  is small enough and the true cost of each edge is large enough, contradiction occurs. Therefore, there is no Pareto
efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium for the graph in Fig. 3 using the first-price path auction mechanism. 
Remark. In the proof of Proposition 2, we implicitly assume that cp6,p7 = cp7,p6 as well as cp7,p8 = cp8,p7 , i.e., edges (p6, p7)
and (p7, p8) are undirected. However, the proof still works for directed graphs. To see this, suppose (p6, p7, p8) is a directed
path from p6 to p8 while there is another directed path P
′
from p8 back to p6 in Fig. 3. Moreover, assume that the edges on
the path P
′
are owned by agents 2 and 3. Then, we can get |bP ′ + C − B| ≤ , where bP ′ is the sum of bidding prices of all
the edges on P
′
, and |A + B − C | ≤ . Thus, the final inequality of the above proof is changed to cp6,p7 + cp7,p8 + cP ′ ≤ 2,
where cP ′ is the true cost of the new directed path from p8 back to p6. Contradiction still occurs.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we studied path auction games in which an agent can own multiple edges, and ownership information is
private. This is a natural model for many scenarios involving team formation and routing. However, our results show that
strategyproofness is not feasible in this extended model. Moreover, path auctions in general graphs may not even have a
Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium. These results suggest several directions for future research. The most
important open problem is to design a reasonable mechanism that bounds the total payment of the auctioneer in settings
such as this. While we prove that such a mechanism cannot be strategyproof, this goal might be achievable with a weaker
solution concept.
Acknowledgments
Ye Du and Yaoyun Shi were supported in part by NSF grant 0347078. Rahul Sami is supported in part by NSF grant CCF-
0728786. We thank Tilman Börgers for helpful discussions on strategyproof mechanisms, Michael Wellman for pointing
out the previous work on false-name proof bidding in combinatorial auctions and Makoto Yokoo for discussions on Pareto
efficiency. We also acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for valuable suggestions to improve the presentations of this
paper.
References
[1] T. Groves, Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–663.
[2] E. Clarke, Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice 11 (1971) 17–33.
[3] N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design, in: Proceedings of 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computation, 1999, pp. 129–140.
[4] W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16 (1961) 8–37.
[5] A. Archer, E. Tardos, Frugal path mechanisms, in: Proceedings of the 2002 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2002, pp. 991–999.
[6] N. Immorlica, D. Karger, E. Nikolova, R. Sami, First-price path auctions, in: Proceedings of 7th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005.
[7] E. Elkind, A. Sahai, K. Steiglitz, Frugality in path auctions, in: Proceedings of 15th ACM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2004.
[8] A.R. Karlin, D. Kempe, T. Tamir, Beyond VCG: Frugality of truthful mechanisms, in: Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, 2005.
[9] M. Yokoo, Y. Sakuri, S. Matsubara, The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions, Games and Economics
Behavior 46 (2004) 174–188.
[10] H. Moulin, On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting, and transferring of jobs, Mathematics of Operations Research 32 (2) (2007) 266–283.
[11] E. Elkind, True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: Edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs, in: Proceedings of 7th ACM conference on
Electronic Commerce, 2005.
[12] A. Archer, E. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001,
pp. 482–491.
[13] V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002.
[14] Y. Du, R. Sami, Y. Shi, Path auction games when an agent can own multiple edges, in: First Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems, 2006.
[15] J. Schummer, Manipulation through bribes, Journal of Economic Theory 91 (2000) 180–198.
[16] A. Iwasaki, Y. Saito, M. Yokoo, D. Kempe, M. Salek, False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring teams, in: The 3rd International Workshop On Internet
And Network Economics, 2007.
